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 How variation in the patterns of share
ownership affects the performance of com-
panies is a field of research that has generated
a large literature spanning a range of
disciplines, particularly economics, law and
management. As its owners, shareholders
collectively occupy a position of fundamental
authority within the firm, giving rise to
certain rights in respect of their assets: the
right to make decisions by voting at company
meetings, the right to transfer assets to
another person and the right to receive
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The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most
other countries in that ownership is relatively dispersed. Majority ownership by a single
shareholder is unusual. It is not uncommon for the largest shareholding to be under 20
percent and in many cases much less than that. A similar pattern occurs in the USA.
The question of voting power is the focus of this paper. Conventional analyses of control
through voting use a 20% rule to identify a controlling bloc, either a single individual or
institutional shareholder or a group voting together.
Theoretical voting power of minority shareholding blocs is studied using a voting power
index. This is applied to a model of ownership control described in Leech (1987) based on
the definition of control used by Berle and Means (1932). The results give support for use
of a 20 percent rule in many cases but not all. Also they support the idea that many
companies are potentially controlled by a bloc of a few large shareholders working in
concert, in almost all cases a voting bloc of the top six shareholdings combined could have
working control whether or not it commanded a majority of the shares. JEL-codes: D72,
G32, G34, C71.income from those assets, and thereby
maintain relationships with the firm. Each of
these dimensions of the relation between
ownership and the management or control of
the firm has stimulated a large volume of
research into some aspect of corporate gover-
nance, and its effect on performance1.
Much conventional literature stresses the
importance of the second dimension, which
is the basis of takeovers and the market for
corporate control as a discipline on manage-
ment, that prevents them departing too far
from maximising the value of the firm and
therefore acting in the interests of the owners.
It is often suggested that, by contrast to this,
governance mechanisms based on relation-
ships between owners and managers, and on
shareholder voting, are ineffective because of
pervasive free rider problems. In a country
where share ownership is widely dispersed as
in the UK, typically shareholdings are so
small, in percentage terms, that on the one
hand their owners lack the necessary incen-
tives to become active owners, and on the
other their voting power is so diluted that
they can have little influence anyway2. Many
studies of the effect of takeovers on per-
formance have been published without
having produced strong evidence that the
market for corporate control has been an
effective corporate governance mechanism;
moreover, the ability to sell shares in an
underperforming company on the open
market has become severely limited as an
aspect of the growth of institutional investors
in recent years. Financial institutions find it
impossible to sell their shares in a company
whose management are not acting sufficiently
in their interests, for a variety of reasons3.
Therefore there are moves towards a reapprai-
sal of the conventional wisdom leading to a
greater emphasis on voting and relationships
between investors and firms.
This study investigates this question of the
relationship between the voting power
represented by shareholdings and control of
the company. I explicitly disregard the free
rider problem and make the assumption that
all shareholders have sufficient incentives to
be active owners in the sense of taking part in
top decision making in the firm. This is to
assume that the private benefit accruing to an
individual shareholder that results from a
correction of management failure following
shareholder action will outweigh the costs
involved to him. This is clearly a reasonable
assumption to make about large shareholders
whose holdings are very substantial accumula-
tions of capital; it is questionable to assume
the same of small shareholders but their role
turns out to be very small anyway and there-
fore I make this assumption as a formality4.
This paper therefore focuses on the
analysis of the voting power of shareholders
and seeks to use it to throw light on the
question of control. The approach followed is
based on the one originally adopted by Berle
and Means in their seminal study of owner-
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1. See Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
2. See Franks and Mayer (1997).
3. Financial institutions are increasingly holding a wide range of companies in their portfolios, because of their
sheer size and the need to diversify. They may also operate tracker funds where they try to mimic an index; to
sell the shares of a company that is doing badly obviously contradicts this and is not feasible. Moreover they will
wish to participate in the upside when the firm recovers. For a financial institution selling the shares is difficult
because there will be few buyers and it will have a destabilising effect on the price, and therefore selling out is
no longer available as an option. See for example Charkham and Simpson (1999).
4. Assuming shareholders to have an active relationship with the firm is reasonable in view of the previous foot-
note.ship and control of US corporations in 19295
in which control through ownership is
assumed to have been identified if there is
found to be a dominant minority shareholder
who has enough voting power to be able to
win votes at company meetings. Voting power
is measured using the technique of power
indices in which the power of a shareholder
depends not only on the size of the holding
but also on how widely held are the other
holdings.
The Measurement of Formal Voting
Power
Shareholders collectively constitute a voting
body which makes collective decisions using
weighted majority voting, each member
having a different number of votes according
to his holding. This makes the analysis of
shareholders’ formal voting power, and of
company control, somewhat difficult because
a key property of weighted voting systems is
that the power of each member – defined as
his capacity to determine the result of any
particular vote or ballot – is not related in any
simple way to his weight. It is necessary to
make a strong distinction between a member’s
voting  weight, represented by his share-
holding, and voting power, as his ability to
determine the outcome of any general ballot.
Power is defined formally in terms of the
outcome of a hypothetical division or ballot
as the member’s ability to swingany coalition6
of players from one which is losing to one
which is winning by joining it, casting his
votes the same way as the others.
An example illustrating this point is a
company with three shareholders whose
holdings are 49, 49 and 2 percent. Clearly
although the weights differ considerably, one
of the shareholdings being very much smaller
than the others, when we consider their
respective powers to swing the decision, they
are all equal. Any two are required for a
majority: the 2 percent player can join with
one other to swing the vote from a minority
with 49 percent to a majority with 51
percent7, and each of the two 49 percent
players can swing the vote from 49 percent to
a majority with 98 percent.
Counting the number of swings each
player can make in this way gives a measure
of absolute voting power. Taking into account
also the total potential number of votes or
ballots which can be taken within the game,
enables a power index to be defined for each
player. Consider first all the four possible
coalitions of votes which the 2 percent player
could join: {Ø} (the empty set), {49}, {49},
(49,49}, the total votes being 0, 49, 49, 98
which would become 2, 51, 51 and 100. It
can therefore swing two of them, the two with
49percent; it can make no difference to the
decision by voting with the coalition in the
other two cases. This player can therefore
swing 1/2 of the decisions so its power index
is 1/2. For one of the 49percent players, the
coalitions are {Ø},{2},{49},{2,49} and the
total numbers of votes are 0, 2, 49, 51 which
become 49, 51, 98, 100. Therefore this player
with 49 percent weight can swing two
decisions out of 4 and therefore its index is
also 1/2. Therefore each of the three players
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5. Berle and Means (1932).
6. The term “coalition” is here used to signify a group of members who cast their votes the same way in a partic-
ular division or ballot. It should not be taken as meaning that the group has any more permanent existence.
However the term will be used in this sense later in the paper when I analyse blocs of shareholdings.
7. The decision rule requires a 51 percent majority here because the examples involve discrete data. The analysis
of the real data later in the paper will use a 50 percent rule.has an ability to swing 1/2. It is mathe-
matically convenient to consider all the
possible voting outcomes which could occur
as if they were random and equally likely since
the approach treated each equally. Therefore
the probability of a swing is 1/2 for each
player.8
By contrast, as an example which
illustrates the utility of the approach, consider
a company with one shareholding of 30
percent and 70 shareholdings of 1 percent. A
decision by majority vote requires 51 percent
support. Consider the power of the large
blocholder. There are 270 different possible
coalitions of the small players, since each can
vote either «for the motion» or «against the
motion». Assuming each small player votes
each way with equal probability indepen-
dently of the others, the total number of votes
cast by them «for the motion» - call this Y - is
distributed with a binomial distribution, with
parameters (in the usual notation) n=70 and
p=0.5, or in the usual shorthand, Y ~ B(70,
0.5). The swing probability of the large player
is then found using this distribution, as the
probability that the large player can swing the
vote, which occurs when Y is at least 21 and
less than 51. This is the binomial probability,
P(21≤Y≤50) = 0.999370. Therefore the 30
percent player is very powerful, in that his
swing probability is very close to unity indeed,
but it is necessary to check the powers of the
small players also to establish relative power.
So consider a player with 1 percent of the
votes. A swing occurs when that player is able
to change a losing coalition into a winning
one, which means changing one with 50
percent of the votes into a 51 percent majority.
In this case it is necessary to consider the total
votes of 69 small players as random and also
to treat the votes of the largest player as being
random. The total number of votes cast by
these small players, say U, has the binomial
distribution, U~B(69, 0.5). To find the swing
probability of a small player with 1 percent of
the votes it is necessary to allow for the large
player as well as the other 69 small players.
There are two equally probable cases: (1)
where the large player votes «for», so therefore
for a swing 30+U =50, and so we must have
U=20; (2) where the large player votes
«against» so therefore U=50 for a swing. The
swing probability for the small player is then
0.5P(U=20)+0.5P(U=50) = 0.000137.
It is clear from this example that the player
with 30 percent is effectively totally dominant
and can be said to have working control, while
the small players individually are virtually
powerless. This property of weighted voting
to assign very great power to a bloc of votes
faced by a very dispersed distribution among
a large number of other players explains why
shareholder power is so important to the
system of corporate governance even in
countries without large concentrations of
share ownership such as the UK. Dispersed
ownership in itself does not necessarily imply
dispersed power.
Power indices
The power index is defined formally as
follows. Let the members of a weighted voting
body be indexed by the set N={1,2,3,…,n}
and let members vote “for” or “against” a
motion in some hypothetical division or
ballot. The weighted votes of individual
members, their shareholdings, are denoted by
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8. There are three players each with a power index of 1/2. In the literature on power indices it is frequently as-
sumed that the total power of decisions is divided among the players so that the indices represent shares of power
and sum to one. In this example if such a normalised index were used each player would have an index of 1/3.
I do not adopt this approach for reasons discussed below, following Coleman (1971).wi and arranged in decreasing size order such
that wi ≥ wi+1 for all i=1,2, …, n. The weights
in this case satisfy wi < 0.5 for all i and ∑wi =
1. A coalition of members all voting “for” is
denoted by a subset of N, S  N. The number
of votes cast by members of S is denoted by
the function w(S) and. Thus,w(S) =  . The
coalition is said to be winning if w(S) ≥ 0.5.
The power index for each player is defined
in terms of swings. A swing is a pair of
coalitions represented by subsets, (Si, Si+{i})
such that w(Si)<0.5 and w(Si+{i})≥0.5. That
is, Si represents a losing coalition which
becomes winning with the addition of the
votes of member i. Let the number of such
swings be ηi taking into account all subsets of
N – {i}. The number of such subsets is 2n-1.
The power index for player i, Πi, is defined as
the relative number of swings:
Πi = ηi/2n-1. i=1,2,…,n.
If all coalitions – that is, all possible voting
outcomes – are taken to be equally likely, this
index can be regarded as a probability,
sometimes referred to as the swing probability.
However it need not be thought of in
probabilistic terms: it is simply the proportion
of the coalitions that do not include member
i that are swings. Assuming the index to be a
probability is convenient for purposes of
computation. However an assumption of
probabilistic voting carries the implication
that shareholders are assumed to vote
randomly, independently of each other with
equal probability “for” and “against”. This
assumption is merely a convenience which
enablesformal voting powerto be analysed and
does not imply that they necessarily behave
in this way. 
This index was originally proposed by
Penrose (1946), in a neglected article, and has
subsequently been re-invented by a number
of other writers, notably Banzhaf (1965), after
whom it is known by various names, notably
the Absolute Banzhaf Index or the Non-
normalised Banzhaf Index, Coleman (1971)
and others9. Many researchers use a
normalised version which has the property
that the power indices sum to unity over all
the members. The reason for doing this is to
enable an analysis in which voting power is
thought of as being shared among the
members10. In this paper I do not use the
normalised power index because I will be
mainly concerned with the power of the
leading shareholder or group of shareholders
in relation to the question of control.
The idea of a power index as a general
measure of formal voting power originated in
the classic paper in the American Political
Science Review in 1954 by Shapley and
Shubik11. The index proposed there, the
Shapley-Shubik index, which is widely used,
and popular among game theorists, is based
on a different voting model to the one just
described, and has the fundamental property
of always being normalised. It has frequently
been compared with the normalised Banzhaf
index. Both these indices are often referred to
in the literature as the classical power indices
and both have been widely applied with
sometimes similar but often widely different
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9. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) give an excellent account of the history of the measurement of voting power.
10. This practice, although widespread, has been challenged by game theorists on the grounds that normalisation
is arbitrary because the swings are not unique, and more fundamentally by Coleman (1971) on grounds that
power is not shared in this way.
11. Shapley and Shubik (1954). Shareholder voting was always suggested as an application of these ideas, right from
the earliest days, see also Shapley (1961).index and, in the absence of compelling
independent evidence on the powers of
players in the real-world weighted voting
games to which they have been applied12, to
something of an impasse in the development
of the field. As a result there has been
considerable theoretical work on the
comparative properties of the indices, to the
proposal of new indices, and also to the
rejection of the power indices approach
entirely13. Nevertheless the method promises
to have utility in the analysis of power in
general voting systems and in the design of
constitutions. A recent study (Leech, 2000a)
addresses this problem of the comparative
utility of the two indices and, on the basis of
a comparison of the empirical performance
of the two “classical” power indices, finds
against the Shapley-Shubik index. This index
of voting power is not therefore used in this
study preferring instead the index due to
Penrose, referred to below simply as a power
index14. The details of the calculation of the
indices are omitted; they can be found in
Leech (2000b) 15.
The applicability of power indices to
shareholder voting
The Shapley-Shubik power index is an
application of the Shapley value (Shapley,
1953) as a means of evaluating the worth to
each player of participating in a co-operative
game. The central idea of the Shapley value is
bargaining among the players over the spoils
of an action resulting from a decision. This
bargaining approach to thinking about voting
in a collectivity was however severely criticised
by Coleman (1971) who argued that the
consequences of a collective decision taken
by majority voting could not usually be
thought of in this way. A decision about an
action that the collectivity could take would
have consequences for the members that
could only be understood in the wider
context, and could not be conceived of as
sharing the spoils. An example from corporate
governance would be a decision to replace the
top management in a public company: if
performance subsequently improved then the
entitlement to the additional profits would
normally be distributed among all share-
holders in proportion to their shareholdings
and not according to their individual voting
powers or in some sense their contributions
to the making of the particular decision. The
alternative approach therefore, and the one
adopted here, is where the results of collective
decisions are in the nature of public goods
with respect to the collectivity concerned;
voting is a matter of political democracy and
the power index is a measure of general voting
power and not a value. 
The approach to the measurement of
power just described treats the firm internally
as a kind of public body. It might be seen as
applicable to a public corporation operating
within a regulatory framework with high
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12. For example the United Nations, the US Presidential Electoral College, the European Union Council, and others.
13. Accounts of the measurement of power and of the different indices and the theoretical debates on their com-
parative properties are given in Lucas (1988), Straffin (1994) and Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
14. Other studios of voting power in international organisations that use weight voting, by the author, which use
the approach advocated by Penrose (1946) and refinements by Coleman (1971) are in Leech  (2000c and 2001).
15. In a previous paper (Cubbin and Leech(1983)), John Cubbin and I proposed a measure of the voting power of
the largest shareholding bloc which we called the degree of control. The degree of control was defined as the prob-
ability that the largest bloc could be on the winning side in a vote, assuming  the same voting model as the
power index. There is a simple relation between it (denoted by α) and the power index for the largest share-
holder, Π1 = 2α -1.standards of corporate governance, including
the legal protection of shareholder rights. This
is in contrast to a firm seen as a source of
profits to be split among the owners by some
sort of bargaining process based on power, a
model perhaps more appropriate to private
companies. The question arises as to whether
the measure of power used is appropriate in
this context given its assumptions. The power
index is a measure of abstract power and has
no regard for preferences or the issues about
which voting takes place. This is obviously
something that has to be qualified since it will
not apply in all cases. It can not be applied to
specific issues with a given distribution of
preferences, for example where all share-
holders are unanimous, such as a policy which
makes them unambiguously happier or one
that reduces the value of the firm with no
offsetting benefits. Nor can this model be used
to make statements about control involving a
powerful minority shareholder being able to
expropriate the majority by appropriating the
private benefits of control to himself.
The approach adopted in this paper is an
essentially political one where the firm is
regarded as a democratic body that has to
make strategic decisions in situations of
fundamental uncertainty where the potential
for making mistakes is enormous. There are
many situations where this occurs. 
For example, a retail company may have
enjoyed considerable success in expanding its
sales of a new brand and have developed a
chain of very profitable shops. The chief
executive may wish to build on this success
by an ambitious policy of expansion on a
much larger scale and proposes the purchase
of a large store, much larger than any in the
chain, in the centre of every major city in the
country. Extrapolating past performance, the
proposal would seem to be profitable, but the
quantum change in scale involved raises the
question of whether the formula that has been
successful in the past would still continue to
be so. Shareholders have the duty of making
the decision under conditions of fundamental
uncertainty. Another example would be where
a successful business expands abroad; there
are many examples of UK companies that
have lost out by attempting to expand into
the United States. The power of large
shareholders is important in such cases where
there is no obviously best action. Other
examples occur where changes in the external
trading environment take place which
necessitate a fundamental strategic reapprai-
sal. One would be a successful clothing retailer
which develops its own credit card primarily
for use in its stores; demand for clothes falls
as the market for clothing changes with
changing consumer tastes leaving the
company with a profitable financial services
division but no longer a profitable clothing
seller. Shareholders will inevitably have to
decide between two incommensurable
strategies: on the one hand, changing the
fundamental nature of the business from
primarily selling clothes to financial services,
and on the other, a new management plan
confidently proposed which will guarantee to
restore former glory. A common case is where
the board of directors is split, the management
on one side and the non-executive directors
on the other, the shareholders having to
resolve the issue. Then voting power becomes
important.
Another example that occurred recently in
the UK is where there are two rival bids to
take over a company, which may differ in the
bid price but are also different in the method
of financing. Both bids are in terms of a
mixture of cash and shares but the higher bid
has a higher share element and there is
uncertainty about what the share value will be
because it depends on many factors. In such a
case the model of shareholder voting applies
since there is no objective reason to vote either
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case where the model might apply is where
the chief executive wishes to be paid a large
rise on promises of future success; shareholders
must decide this on the basis of unknowable
future performance. Where there is always this
kind of uncertainty is in the appointment of
directors and especially the chief executive;
there may be two candidates with similar track
records and there may be strong reasons for
appointing each, but there may turn out to be
large differences in competence in the future
were either to be appointed.
In all such cases, the voting model used to
measure shareholder power is a reasonable
approximation and also the voting power of
large shareholders is important in determining
the outcome. Shareholders usually have to
decide whether to accept management
proposals to enhance shareholder wealth with
associated benefits for managers. Often the
benefit obtained by management is in the
short run and that by shareholders over a much
longer term so the latter must make decisions
about voting subject to a lot of uncertainty. In
the absence of substantial share ownership by
management, which is a reasonable assump-
tion since directors’ holdings are no longer
significant in the great majority of companies
in the UK, there is little difference of interest
among shareholders, and therefore share-
holders are not likely to be committed to any
particular side in the vote. It is therefore
reasonable to use the power indices approach
to measure voting power and infer something
about shareholder control.
A Model of Ownership Control
In previous work (Leech (1987)) I proposed a
model of minority ownership control in the
spirit of Berle and Means based on the formal
voting power of the largest bloc of shares as
measured by a power index. A company is
classified as owner-controlled if the power
index for the largest shareholder, or group of
shareholders, exceeds some very high level
and no other shareholder or group has any
appreciable voting power. The essential
advantage of this approach over the conven-
tional “fixed rules” approach to identifying
control used by many authors16 is that the
power of a large owner depends not only on
the percentage of the voting equity he has but
also on the distribution of all the other
shareholdings. The fixed rule infers control
only from the size of the largest bloc and this
can be misleading if the other holdings are
not widely dispersed and there is another large
holding that could be voted independently.
Thus, for example, a shareholder with 20%
of the shares could be regarded as controlling
in some cases but not in others on the basis of
power indices, while he would always be
deemed to be controlling if a fixed 20% rule
were used.
Figure 1 shows the model of minority
voting control described in Leech (1987). The
horizontal axis shows the number of
shareholder members of the potential
controlling coalition or bloc, starting with the
largest and adding successively smaller
holdings. A bloc of k members has skshares
and its power is indicated by its power index,
Πk; both functions are shown on the vertical
axis. A typical concentrated ownership struc-
ture is shown with the ownership-concentra-
tion function skrepresented by AB and the
power-index function Πk represented by CD.
The group has majority control when it has
k’ members, such that sk’ = 0.5 and therefore
Πk’ = 1. It is assumed to have working control
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16. See Short (1994) for a survey. La Porta et. al. (1999) have recently used a fixed rule based on 20%.when its power index is very close to 1. In the
diagram this is represented as being when the
bloc size is k* members, with sk*shares, and
its voting power is Π*. The threshold Π* is
chosen appropriately. This model is the basis
of the empirical approach reported in the next
section17. Since the model is being used here
to examine properties of the distribution of
ownership, and the blocs are potential rather
than actual, in the results section below they
are referred to as “controlling” in quotes.
The Data Set: A Sample of Large
UK Companies
The data set is based on 444 companies taken
from the sample collected by Leech and Leahy
(1991), leaving out those where there was a
majority shareholder. All were listed on the
London Stock Exchange in the mid-eighties
and included about a third of the Times 1000
as well as some smaller companies and some
financial companies. They comprise neither a
representative sample nor a random sample
since they were chosen on the sole basis of the
availability of detailed ownership data to give
the voting weights. The source was a
commercial information service called «Who
Owns What on the London Stock Exchange,»
which existed briefly, to which one could
subscribe annually and receive periodic
printouts showing details of all shareholdings
greater in size than 0.25 percent of the total
of each class of equity18.
For most companies there was only one
class of voting share but in the small number
Shareholder voting power and corporate governance 41
17. There is a potential causality problem here since the model can be used to determine control endogenously by
choosing the shape of the curve sk. Therefore we might expect observed ownership structures of actual firms to
reflect this.
18. The Warwick University Library took out a one-year subscription to it at my suggestion.
Figure 1: A model of “Minority Control”of cases where there were two, they were
combined into one distribution taking into
account any differences in voting weights and
voting rules. Many of the holdings were in
the names of nominee companies but
wherever possible these were reassigned to
their beneficiaries using a directory of
nominees provided with the subscription to
identify them. Holdings in the same firm by
different members of the founding family,
and other interest groups closely associated
with the company, were amalgamated into a
single bloc using surnames and other
information. The data used therefore can be
assumed to be reasonably close to beneficial
holdings taking into account voting
alliances.19
The data collected were based on searches
of company registers made in 1985 and 1986.
The number of large shareholdings observed
(after amalgamation by Leech and Leahy)
varies in the sample between a minimum of
12 and a maximum of 56, with a median of
27. The proportions of voting equity these
represent vary between 19 percent and 99
percent, the median being 66 percent. The
dataset is therefore both detailed and fairly
comprehensive.
The data are summarised in Table 1. The
table shows the distribution of the size of the
largest shareholding, w1, and also the joint
distribution of w1 with the second-largest
holding, w2, in order to indicate the variation
in patterns of ownership concentration
between firms in the sample. Some 49
companies have relatively concentrated voting
structures with w1 greater than 30%, but in
the great majority of cases w1 is less than 30
percent. There is also a wide range of variation
in the size of w2 given w1. For example in the
group of 85 companies where w1 is between
20% and 30%, w2is less than 10% in 38 cases,
between 10% and 20% in a further 38 cases
and greater than 20% in 9 cases.
The Problem of Incomplete Data
and the use of Oceanic Games
The data collected on the distribution of share
ownership is necessarily incomplete because
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19. The source and method of construction of the data set are described in Leech and Leahy (1991). There might
remain a slight underestimation of the true concentration of ownership to the extent this information was
incomplete.
Table 1. The Sample: The Largest Holding versus the Second Largest
w1
<5% 5-10%$ 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% Total
41 144 125 85 30 19 444
< 5% 41 46 15 12 2 2 118
5-10% 98 73 26 10 9 216
w2 10-20% 37 38 11 5 91
20-30% 9 4 2 15
30-40% 3 1 4
40-50% 0 0large public companies typically have many
thousands of shareholders and it would
obviously be prohibitive to collect them all.
In any case, there would be little to be gained
because in practice almost all of these are far
too small to represent any real voting power.
On the other hand, they have a formal role to
play in the voting bodies being analysed and
therefore we must deal with them
appropriately.
The solution to this incompleteness
problem, that is adopted here, is to consider,
and analyse separately, two modified share
ownership structures for which the data we
do observe would be appropriate. Two sets of
indices are calculated, assuming two different
games where the unobserved shareholders
conform to two extremes of “concentrated”
and“dispersed” ownership; both of these cases
are arithmetically consistent with the
observed data. The «concentrated» case takes
the extreme that the unobserved weights are
all equal to the threshold for observation,
0.25%20 and the number of players is finite
although large. The «dispersed» case assumes
an «oceanic game» in which it is assumed that
the unobserved very small holdings are
individually infinitesimally small and they are
infinite in number.
Thus, for any company, let the largest k
shareholdings (out of n in total) be observed
represented by w1, w2, w3, etc. in decreasing
order of size, the smallest being wk (normally
equal to 0.0025). There is no information
about the remaining n-k holdings except that
they are all no larger than wk. It is not
necessary to know n, the total number of
shareholders in the company; although this
information could be collected from share
registers, it would add extremely little to the
analysis to do so. The two limiting cases are
referred to respectively as limiting case C
(Concentrated) and limiting case D
(Dispersed). 
For limiting case C it is necessary to find
the corresponding value for the finite number
of shareholders. If wk is the smallest weight
observed in the data, then we know that all
the non-observed weights are no greater than
wk. The most concentrated pattern of
ownership occurs when these are all equal to
wk. Then the corresponding number of
shareholders, n’, is,
n’ =  integerpart((1 - sk)/wk) + k + 1. 
The distribution of voting weights in limiting
case C is then obtained by letting wi = wk for
all i = k+1, ..., n’-1 and wn’ = 1 - sk - (n’-k -
1)wk. Obviously wk = 0.0025.
These two limiting cases are analysed
separately, case C using the algorithm
described in Leech (2000b) to calculate the
indices for all n’ assumed members and case
D as an «oceanic game”. Power indices for
oceanic games have been thoroughly studied
and there is a good literature on them. The
approach adopted here follows Dubey and
Shapley (1979), who showed that the power
indices for an oceanic game with k major
players with combined weight of sk and a
majority requirement or quota of q are the
same as for a finite game consisting only of
the k major players and a modified quota of 
q - (1-sk)/2. These can be calculated using the
algorithm of Leech (2000b).21 However there
was very little difference in the results from
the two polar cases.
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20. Strictly slightly smaller.
21. Typically the finite games assumed for case C have upwards of n' =300 players and require an algorithm which
can cope with such large games. As regards the oceanic games in case D, the results of Dubey and Shapley are
subject to conditions on q to ensure existence, but in this case q=0.5 and the conditions are always met.44 Dennis Leech
Table 2. Power Indices for Top Shareholders, Illustrative Companies
Company Shareholder: 1 2 3 5 10 20
Plessey Weight 0.019 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.004
Index (C) 0.254 0.192 0.165 0.134 0.112 0.052
Index (D) 0.361 0.268 0.230 0.185 0.154 0.071
United Spring Weight 0.123 0.109 0.098 0.037 0.014 0.005
& Steel Index (C)  0.502 0.433 0.391 0.117 0.046 0.016
Index (D) 0.508 0.440 0.400 0.113 0.045 0.016
Suter Weight 0.128 0.065 0.053 0.031 0.017 0.009
Index (C)  0.692 0.246 0.209 0.120 0.068 0.034
Index (D) 0.707 0.244 0.210 0.121 0.068 0.034
Ranks Hovis Weight 0.149 0.037 0.035 0.022 0.014 0.008
McDougall Index (C)  0.912 0.070 0.068 0.047 0.031 0.017
Index (D) 0.940 0.053 0.052 0.038 0.025 0.014
International Weight 0.163 0.032 0.018 0.016 0.011 0.004
Signal Index  (C)  0.984 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.003
& Control Index (D) 0.998 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Sun Life Weight 0.222 0.035 0.019 0.013 0.009 0.005
Index (C)  0.9996 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
Index (D) 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Liberty Weight 0.2263 0.2257 0.089 0.050 0.018
Index (C)  0.5013 0.4982 0.278 0.132 0.047
Index (D) 0.5014 0.4983 0.280 0.133 0.047
Securicor Weight 0.316 0.073 0.053 0.029 0.016 0.008
Index (C)  0.997 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001
Index (D) 0.998 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bulgin Weight 0.310 0.222 0.045 0.028 0.009 0.003
Index (C)  0.862 0.138 0.122 0.079 0.025 0.007
Index (D) 0.874 0.126 0.120 0.082 0.025 0.007
Ropner Weight 0.410 0.060 0.050 0.020 0.012 0.003
Index (C)  1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Index (D) 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Steel Brothers Weight 0.425 0.213 0.038 0.030 0.007 0.003
Index (C)  0.9996 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001
Index (D) 0.9999 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Associated Weight 0.4995 0.026 0.021 0.021 0.013 0.006
Newspapers Index (C)  1.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Index (D) 1.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Results
Power Indices for Illustrative Companies
Table 2 presents power indices for large
shareholdings in some illustrative companies.
The firms have been selected to span the range
of variation in the first two shareholdings
within the sample. Plessey has the most
dispersed ownership with a largest
shareholding of under 2% and Associated
Newspapers is one of several which are just
short of having majority control. Two firms
have been selected in each range of values for
w1: 10 – 20%, 20 – 30%, 30 – 40%,
40 – 50%. In each range the two companies
are those with relatively large and small values
for w2. The results for these firms might then
be taken as illustrative of the effects of
ownership concentration in terms both of the
size of the largest holding and the relative
dispersion of the other holdings as reflected
in the second largest. Results are shown for
representative shareholders numbered 1, 2, 3,
5, 10 and 20. Figure 2 shows corresponding
graphs for the power indices for the top ten
shareholders of the same companies.
The values of the power indices in Table 2
are sensitive to differences in ownership
structure and vary considerably. They appear
to conform to commonly held a priorinotions
of the power of shareholding blocs of a given
size in relation to others. Where ownership is
widely dispersed as in the case of Plessey,
power is also widely dispersed. Where it is
highly concentrated, as in Ropner or Steel
Brothers, with a shareholding over 40%,
giving control, the index reflects this. In other
cases where ownership is less concentrated,
there is considerable variety of results
associated with differences in ownership
structure.
A comparison of Sun Life and Liberty, for
example, shows the sensitivity of the power of
the largest shareholder to the size of the
second largest shareholding. The 22% largest
shareholding in Sun Life has a power index
over 99% suggesting that it can be regarded
as a controlling holding and reflecting the
relatively high dispersion of ownership of the
other 78% of shares. In the case of Liberty,
however, both the largest two holdings are
above 22% which must mean that the largest
shareholder is not much more powerful than
the second-largest and this result is obtained;
both have an index of about 0.5 and, in this
case, the third shareholder has enhanced
power as a result. A similar finding emerges
for companies with a shareholding of between
30 and 40 percent. A 31% shareholding has a
power index over 99% in Securicor where
there are no other large owners. On the other
hand a similar-sized stake in Bulgin has an
index of only 86% because of the presence of
a large second shareholder with 22% of the
votes.
These results are plausible in that they are
in broad agreement with both the results of
Berle and Means and more recent conven-
tional ideas about the power of shareholder
blocs and minority ownership control. It has
been possible to find many cases where the
power index for a voting bloc greater than 20
percent is extremely close to 100 percent.
The Complete Sample
Results for the full sample are shown in Figure
322. Figure 3(a) shows the respective power
indices for the largest shareholding, Π1,
against its size w1; Figure 3(b) shows the
equivalent plots after the largest 4
shareholdings have been combined into a
single bloc, of size s4. Only the results for Case
C have been presented since the oceanic
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Figure 2: Power indices for the top ten shareholdings. Illustrative companies.
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0indices for Case D are very close to them.
These plots are useful for giving an insight
into the respective behaviour of the power
indices in the population as a whole and their
potential as a basis for identifying minority
control.
There is considerable variation reflecting
differences in ownership structure. Concen-
tration in terms of the size of the largest
shareholding has very little effect up to over
15% but after that power varies widely. These
results suggest that shareholdings between 20
and 30 percent can be said to have voting
control in many cases but not in many others.
Voting control is possible on the basis of a
holding below 20 percent but such cases are
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0not common. Most (but not all) holdings
greater than 35 percent have a power index
almost equal to 1. The variation among firms
suggests that this index may be useful as a
guide to differences in company control by
shareholders.
Figure 3(b) shows that combining the top
four shareholdings into one voting bloc is very
powerful indeed in most cases. In some
companies such blocs would be majority
shareholders but it is interesting that the result
does not depend on this. Intuitively
combining top shareholdings in the manner
assumed has a double effect in both increasing
concentration via the size of the bloc and
reducing the dispersion of the remainder;
these effects reinforce one another in con-
centrating voting power.
Potential controlling blocs
Figure 4 examines the model of ownership
control by a bloc of large shareholders,
presented above, in the light of the data, by
graphing the power of blocs of different sizes.
Results are shown for two illustrative
companies in which the power indices have
been calculated for each assumed bloc of
shares, of size sk, for k=1 to 2023, and the
ownership concentration curve. Plots are
given for two companies, Plessey, which has
the most dispersed ownership structure, and
Birmid Qualcast, only slightly more concen-
50 Dennis Leech
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Figure 4: The power of a block of large shareholders
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0trated. Each plot shows the number of
members of the group, k, on the horizontal
axis and sk , the size of the bloc, and the
associated power index (for both cases C and
D) on the vertical axis. The plots show the
same general pattern for both companies,
consistent with the theoretical model in
Figure 1. The inference can be drawn that for
the great majority of companies a bloc
comprising a small number of top share-
holders would effectively have control. This
pattern is typical of the whole sample, not
just of these two illustrative companies.
Figure 5 investigates this effect by
calculating the proportion of the sample
which would satisfy the definition of control
by blocs of different numbers of shareholders
on different definitions of the voting power
threshold for control, Π*=0.99, 0.999 and
0.9999 respectively. It shows that it is
pervasive and that the power of a shareholder
bloc comprising, say, the top six holdings
would be very considerable indeed in most
companies. Using the voting power control
threshold Π*=0.9999, over 75 percent of the
companies in the sample would be deemed to
be owner controlled. Virtually every company
in the sample would be owner-controlled by
the top ten shareholders combined.
Figure 6 shows the size distribution of
these “controlling” blocs in terms of the
concentration of ownership they represent
using the Π*=0.9999 criterion. It shows that
the effect reported in the previous two
paragraphs does not depend on the blocs
having a voting majority. For example, where
there are controlling blocs comprising just the
top six shareholders (75% of the sample
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PI>0.99 9.7% 30.2% 50.7% 70.5% 89.9% 97.3% 98.6% 99.5% 99.8% 99.8% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
PI>0.999 6.8% 24.1% 39.4% 52.9% 70.9% 86.9% 95.0% 97.7% 98.6% 99.3% 99.3% 99.8% 99.8% 100.0%
PI>0.9999 4.7% 20.0% 33.6% 46.6% 59.2% 75.0% 88.3% 94.6% 96.8% 98.0% 98.6% 99.3% 99.3% 99.8%
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Figure 5: Potential controlling blocs
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Numbers of Members  of Block
"Control" defined by Power Index>0.9999





10 to 20%shares 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.9% 0.9% 1.8% 1.1% 1.4% 1.1% 1.1%
20 to 30%shares 0.7% 2.0% 2.3% 4.7% 5.6% 8.1% 11.9% 12.4% 11.0% 8.1% 7.9% 6.5% 5.7% 5.0%
30 to 40%shares 2.5% 4.3% 6.1% 9.5% 14.6% 22.5% 25.2% 24.5% 22.1% 20.9% 18.2% 16.7% 14.0% 14.4%
40 to 50%shares 3.6% 6.5% 11.7% 12.4% 14.6% 14.2% 17.3% 18.7% 20.0% 21.4% 21.2% 20.9% 21.9% 20.5%
more than 50% 0.0% 7.2% 13.5% 20.0% 24.3% 30.2% 33.6% 38.1% 42.8% 45.7% 50.2% 53.8% 56.6% 58.8%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Figure 6: The sizes of potential controlling blocs
Percentages of Firm “Controlled” by Shareholder Blocks 
with Different Numbers of Members
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0%companies), in only 30 percent of cases does
the bloc have a majority of the shares, and in
22 percent of cases it is between 30 and 40
percent of the equity. On the other hand, it
represents between 20 and 30 percent of the
equity in 8.1 percent of cases.
Conclusions
This paper has looked at the voting power of
large shareholders in the widely dispersed
ownership observed on the stock market of
the United Kingdom. It has adopted a
methodology due to Berle and Means
supplemented by the technique of power
indices for measuring power derived from
game theory. The empirical findings are
consistent with earlier work and also
institutional practice.
The results show that a significant
minority shareholder can be very powerful,
almost as powerful as a majority shareholder,
if the dispersion of the rest of the holdings is
sufficient. In most companies a 20 percent
shareholding can have working control, but
in other companies the figure is greater and
in some less. In almost all companies if the
top shareholders formed a voting bloc this
would be extremely powerful. In almost all
companies the top six shareholders could
form a voting bloc with working control,
whether or not it had a majority of the shares.
The approach has treated the company as
a quasi-political body in which shareholders
are voters choosing public goods, a reasonable
way of looking at a public company where
there are good standards of corporate
governance. It ignores completely the
question of incentives. A better model might
be one which recognises that shareholders are
of two types: those with substantial stakes
who have strong private incentives to take
part in collective action and those whose
stakes are so small that it is rational for them
to abstain. This requires a model of
shareholder incentives and is the subject of
future work. However such a model of voting
power would be likely to show that relatively
small holdings are in fact very powerful within
the reduced group of active shareholders that
would be identified. The approach adopted
here, where all shareholders are taken into
account regardless of size, biases the analysis
away from finding considerable shareholder
power and therefore makes the results more
significant.
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